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California v. Acevedo. The Court establishes one
rule to govern all automobile searches and opens
the door to another "frontal assault" on the
warrant requirement
1. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long struggled with the vexatious
issue of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.' The Court once again attempted to clarify
this "intolerably confusing"2 area last Term in California v.
Acevedo.' Acevedo held that police may search all containers found
in an automobile, without a warrant, whether they have probable
cause directed specifically at a container within a vehicle, or gener-
ally at the vehicle itself.4 This holding eliminated an anomaly in
the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence5 and established
one rule governing all automobile searches. However, in addition
to refining the law of automobile searches and seizures, the Court
created another, more disturbing anomaly and may have laid the
logical groundwork for the eventual elimination of the warrant re-
quirement for searches conducted outside the home.
Part II of this Comment examines the history and evolution
of the automobile exception. Part III recounts the facts, ruling,
and reasoning of Acevedo. Part IV assesses the potentially significant
repercussions of the anomaly Acevedo created. This part analyzes
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion on how the anomaly should be
1 The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
3 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
4 Id. at 1991.
5 See discussion infra parts II.C., IV. The Court's precedents permitted the police to
search a closed container found within a vehicle only when they had probable cause to
believe that contraband was contained somewhere inside the vehicle. Then, if they hap-
pened to discover a closed container they could open it without a warrant. Conversely, if
the police had probable cause to search a specific container that happened to be located
inside an automobile, they could not open it without a warrant.
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dealt with in light of the warrant requirement's history. It also
suggests that the Court, using Acevedo's rationale, can cripple
much of the warrant requirement's effectiveness by limiting its
applicability to private homes. Part V concludes that the potential-
ly wide applications of Acevedo's logical implications could be the
first step in removing the warrant requirement for searches con-
ducted outside the home.
II. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE
AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the "cardinal
principle that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by a judge or magistrate are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject to a few specifical-
ly established and well-delineated exceptions."'6 One of these ex-
ceptions was specifically established in Carroll v. United States7 and
subsequently became known as the automobile exception. Since its
inception in Carroll to its current form in Acevedo, the automobile
exception has undergone significant transformations as its underly-
ing justifications have been modified and refined.
A. The Original Justiflcation and
Its Expansion
The automobile exception was born 67 years ago in Carroll v.
United States. In Carrol government agents had probable cause to
believe that a car driven by George Carroll was transporting intoxi-
cating liquors in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The
agents stopped defendant's car, conducted a warrantless search,
and discovered 68 bottles of whiskey and gin behind the seats'
upholstery. Defendants8 were convicted of transporting intoxicat-
ing liquor. On appeal they argued that the warrantless search and
seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
6 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)). For an explanation of why reasonableness
alone has been considered insufficient to support a search, see infra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
7 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
8 John Kiro, a passenger of Carroll's, was also charged and convicted of transport-
ing intoxicating liquor. Id. at 132.
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Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft extensively reviewed
the history of the National Prohibition Act.9 He concluded that
Congress clearly intended to distinguish between the necessity for
a search warrant when searching a private dwelling and the neces-
sity for a search warrant when searching a road vehicle.' ° Con-
gress did not require a warrant in the latter case, while a warrant
was a condition precedent to a lawful search in the former. After
discussing similar distinctions in Congressional legislation passed
between 1789 and 1899," the Court held that the impracticability
of obtaining a warrant, before a mobile vehicle could be moved
out of the jurisdiction, justified such disparate treatment.
12
An automobile's inherent mobility made the procurement of
a warrant impractical and constitutionally allowed the police, upon
probable cause,13 to dispense with the warrant requirement in an
automobile search. The Court emphasized this point, warning that
"[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practica-
ble, it must be used." 4 The impracticability of obtaining a war-
rant, therefore, provided the sole justification for ushering the
automobile exception into the Court's Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.
The impracticability justification took on new meaning in
Chambers v. Maroney."5 The issue presented was whether police
could take an automobile, believed to contain contraband, to the
9 267 U.S. at 143-47.
10 The legislative history indicated that Congress intended to require a search war-
rant only when a law enforcement officer searched a private dwelling, thereby leaving the
way open for warrantless searches of mobile vehicles. Id. at 147.
11 Id. at 150-53.
121 The Court held that:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of gov-
ernment, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store,
dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant
readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automo-
bile for contraband goods, where it is not practical to secure a warrant, because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153.
13 The Court noted that such warrantless searches had to be based upon probable
cause. T'he measure of legality . . . is . . . that the seizing officer shall have reasonable
or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contra-
band . . . therein." Id. at 155-56.
14 Id. at 156.
15 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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police station before proceeding with the warrantless search Carroll
authorized. The Court recognized that "[a]rguably, because of the
preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobilization of
the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained;
arguably, only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible until the magis-
trate authorizes the 'greater.'"' 6 Once police had immobilized the
car and subjected it to their complete control at the station, it
was, of course, no longer impractical to obtain a warrant.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to determine which search
was the greater intrusion and which was the lesser, holding that
"[flor constitutional purposes, we see no difference between, on
the one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other hand, car-
rying out an immediate search without a warrant."17 Carroll would
have permitted the warrantless search of the car, based upon
probable cause, when it was initially stopped; therefore, the police
could search the same car based upon the same probable cause
after following the reasonable course of taking it back to the sta-
18tion.
The Chambers ruling expanded the automobile exception by
allowing police to search a car without judicial authorization, even
when the car is under the exclusive control of the police and it
would not be impractical to obtain a warrant. The government
would seek to further extend this ruling by attempting to apply it
to all personal property interests outside the home.
B. The Court Rejects the Frontal Assault
The warrant requirement's durability was directly challenged
in Chadwick v. United States.9 In Chadwick government agents had
probable cause to believe that a footlocker, which defendants
placed in a car trunk, contained contraband. Before the car was
started, the agents arrested the defendants, seized the car with the
footlocker still inside the trunk, and took it to the Federal Build-
ing. An hour and a half after the arrests, with the footlocker un-
der the government's exclusive control, the agents conducted a
16 Id. at 51.
17 Mo. at 52. The police in Chambers did neither, they took the car back to the po-
lice station before proceeding with a warrantless search.
18 The Court noted that it was not unreasonable to take the car back to the station
because all its occupants were arrested in a dark parking lot. Under these circumstances
an immediate search would have been both impractical and unsafe. Id. at 52 n.10.
19 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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warrantless search of its contents and found a large amount of
marijuana inside.20
The Court unanimously rejected the government's argument
that the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause protected only in-
terests traditionally associated with the home.21 The Court also
rejected the government's alternative contention that the rationale
of the automobile exception cases permitted the warrantless search
of the luggage.'
In dismissing the government's analogy between mobile per-
sonal property and automobiles, the Court added anotherjustifica-
tion for the automobile exception: automobiles are surrounded by
a reduced expectation of privacy.2- By contrast, "a person's expec-
tations of privacy in personal luggage... [are] substantially
greater than in an automobile" and thus deserve the greater pro-
tection that a warrant provides.
24
Nor did the footlocker's mobility justify circumventing the
warrant requirement. Once the agents had it "under their exclu-
sive control, there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker
or its contents could have been removed before a valid search
warrant could be obtained."' This is not always true for auto-
mobiles, because secure storage facilities may not be available and
an automobile's size and mobility make it susceptible to theft and
intrusion by vandals.
26
In Chambers the Court was unwilling to decide whether an
immediate search of an automobile or its seizure and immobiliza-
tion pending the issuance of a warrant was the greater intrusion
upon Fourth Amendment values; given probable cause to search,
20 Id. at 4-5.
21 Id. at 6-11. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist
joined, but agreed with the Court's analysis on the applicability of the Warrant Clause.
See id. at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 11-13.
23 "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or the repository of personal ef-
fects . ... It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are
in plain view." Id. at 12 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality
opinion)). Other factors contributing to this reduced expectation of privacy include regis-
tration and licensing requirements, regulation of the condition and manner in which
motor vehicles may be operated on public highways, and official inspections. 433 U.S. at
13.
24 Id. at 13. The Court pointed out that the factors which reduce an automobiles
privacy, see supra note 22, are inapplicable to luggage. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 13 n.7.
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both choices were constitutionally acceptable.2 7 The principal
privacy interest in a footlocker or other piece of luggage, however,
lies in its contents, which are not exposed to public view. Conse-
quently, the search of its interior is "a far greater intrusion into
Fourth Amendment values" than its seizure and impoundment.
2
The Court was again asked to expand the automobile excep-
tion two years later in Arkansas v. Sanders.' The issue was wheth-
er police must first obtain a warrant before searching luggage
taken from an automobile properly stopped and searched.' Po-
lice had probable cause to believe that the defendant's suitcase
contained marijuana when he placed it in a taxi's trunk and drove
away. The cab was stopped, the suitcase was opened, and marijua-
na was discovered. The State contended that the automobile ex-
ception validated the warrantless search.3'
The Court recalled the two reasons for the distinction be-
tween automobiles and other private property. "First, . . . the
inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impractical to
obtain a warrant. In addition, the configuration, use, and regula-
tion of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of
privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property. "32
Since neither reason for permitting the warrantless search of auto-
mobiles applied to luggage,3 there was "no greater need for war-
rantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of lug-
gage taken from other places."'M Therefore, the Court found "no
justification for the extension of Caroll... to ... one's personal
luggage merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully
stopped by police. "
The third case inviting the Court to extend the automobile
exception to cover closed containers found within automobiles was
27 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
28 433 U.S. at 13 n.8.
29 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
30 IiL at 754.
31 1& at 762.
32 Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
33 Once the officers had seized the luggage and had it within their exclusive control
there was nothing impractical about obtaining a warrant. And luggage, being a common
repository for one's personal effects, is intimately associated with the expectation of priva-
cy. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
34 Id. at 764.
35 Id. at 765.
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Robbins v. California.s For the third time in five years, the Court
declined to accept the invitation.
In Robbins, police officers opened two packages wrapped in
green opaque plastic, finding bricks of marijuana in each. Reaf-
firming Chadwick and Sanders, the plurality held that "a closed
piece of luggage found in a lawfully stopped car is constitutionally
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage
found anywhere else." 7 Because closed containers manifest a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, all such containers were protected
by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment unless a contain-
er "so clearly announce[d] its contents ... [they were] obvious to
an observer."3
By the end of 1981, then, the automobile exception had
thrice been confined strictly to automobiles. After Chadwick, how-
ever, the original impracticability justification of Carroll was aug-
mented by the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy rationale. Automo-
biles are principally used for transportation, not as repositories for
personal effects; the expectation of privacy associated with automo-
biles is, therefore, much lower than that associated with other
personal property.
Notwithstanding the inherent mobility of closed containers
taken from lawfully stopped automobiles, they did not share an
automobile's general characteristic of reduced privacy and could
not be searched on the basis of probable cause alone.3 9 The re-
duced expectation of privacy surrounding automobiles thus be-
came the principal reason for the automobile exception. In the
wake of Chadwick, Sanders, and Robbins it appeared as though the
general principle requiring a warrant before closed packages and
containers could be opened would remain inviolable in the face of
the automobile exception's attempted encroachments upon it.
C. Absolute Protection for
Containers Curtailed
The year after it decided Robbins, the Court again addressed
the scope of a search conducted under the automobile exception.
In United States v. RossP0 police officers had probable cause to be-
36 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion).
37 Id. at 425.
38 Id. at 428.
39 See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
40 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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lieve that defendant Ross was selling narcotics from his car's
trunk. After stopping his vehicle, an officer opened the trunk,
found a closed paper bag, opened it and discovered heroin.4'
Ross argued that under Chadwick and Sanders the warrantless
search exceeded the permissible scope of the automobile excep-
tion and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.42
The Court distinguished Chadwick and Sanders by observing
that in neither of those cases "did police have probable cause to
search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker in
the former case and the green suitcase in the latter."3 Neither of
those cases involved the automobile exception, "because the police
there had probable cause to search the double-locked footlocker
and the suitcase respectively before either came near an automo-
bile.""
In Ross, on the other hand, the "police officers had probable
cause to search [the] entire vehicle."45 Relying upon this distinc-
tion, the Court overruled the plurality decision in Robbins and
held that:
[T]he scope of the warrantless search authorized by [the auto-
mobile] exception is no broader and no narrower than a mag-
istrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justi-
fies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that
may conceal the object of the search.4'
The reasonable expectation of privacy that Chadwick, Sanders, and
Robbins found intimately associated with every closed container
yielded to the law-enforcement interest of carrying out an immedi-
ate search.
Ross legalized the warrantless search of closed containers
found within automobiles only when the police had probable
cause to believe that contraband was contained somewhere within
the vehicle. Because a search warrant would carry the legal author-
ity to open containers inside an automobile, where the object of
the search would likely be found, the scope of a warrantless search
41 The police also discovered a pistol in the glove compartment and a zippered red
leather pouch, containing $3,200 cash, in the trunk. Id. at 801.
42 Id. at 801-02.
43 Id. at 814.
44 Id. at 816 (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
45 456 U.S. at 817.
46 Id. at 825.
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was just as broad.47 However, when police had probable cause to
search only a particular container within an automobile, and not
the automobile generally, Chadwick and Sanders operated to re-
quire a warrant before a lawful search could proceed.
The original impracticability justification would not support
extending the automobile exception to closed containers, even
when the general search was supported by probable cause. Once
police seize a container and bring it within their exclusive control,
there is nothing impractical about obtaining the approval of a
neutral and detached magistrate before searching it. Nor would
the post-Chadwick rationale of a reduced reasonable expectation of
privacy permit such a search, because closed containers are closely
associated with the reasonable expectation of privacy." Despite
these apparent inconsistencies, the Court found that the law en-
forcement interest in an immediate search outweighed any privacy
interests in the bag and again extended the automobile excep-
tion 49 - paving the way for a greater extension in Acevedo.
III. THE ACEVEDO DEcISION
A. The Facts and Ruling
On October 30, 1987, police officers observed Charles Ste-
phen Acevedo leave an apartment, known to contain marijuana,
carrying a small brown paper bag." The bag was the size of a
wrapped marijuana package. Acevedo placed it in his car and
started to drive away. The officers stopped the car, opened the
trunk and the bag, and discovered the marijuana.
5'
Acevedo's motion to suppress the marijuana was denied, but
the California Court of Appeal reversed.52 Because the officers'
probable cause was directed specifically at the bag, rather than at
the automobile generally, the court concluded that the case was
controlled by Chadwick, not Ross.5" The officers could lawfully
seize the paper bag based upon their probable cause, but under
Chadwick they could not open it without first obtaining a warrant.
After the California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for
47 Id at 820-21 (footnote omitted).
48 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see also supra note 33.
49 456 U.S. at 823.
50 California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1984 (1991).
51 Id. at 1985 (footnote omitted).
52 People v. Acevedo, 216 Cal. App. 3d 586, 265 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1990).
53 111 S. Ct. at 1985.
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review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine
the law applicable to closed containers in automobiles.'
The Court's analysis relied heavily on Ross, which "distin-
guished the Carroll doctrine from the separate rule that governed
the search of closed containers"5 and "took the critical step of
saying that closed containers in cars could be searched without a
warrant because of their presence within the automobile."56 Ross
rejected Chadwick's distinction between containers and cars, con-
cluding that the expectation of privacy in one's vehicle equals
one's expectation of privacy in a container.
5 7
The Court agreed with the Ross dissenters" that a container
found after a general search of an automobile and a container
found in a car after a limited search for the container are equally
easy for the police to store and for the suspect to hide or de-
stroy5 9 Finding "no principled distinction in terms of either the
privacy expectation or the exigent circumstances between the pa-
per bag found by the police in Ross and the paper bag found by
the police here,"6 the Court ruled that the warrantless search of
Acevedo's bag was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
B. The Court's Rationale
The Court reasoned that the attempt to differentiate between
a container for which the police were specifically searching and a
container which they coincidentally came across during a general
automobile search provided only minimal protection for privacy
and impeded effective law enforcement.61 The Court offered sev-
eral reasons for that conclusion.
First, "[t]he line between probable cause to search a vehicle
and probable cause to search a package in that vehicle is not
always clear, and separate rules ... may enable the police to
broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve
privacy interests."2 This is so because "[i]f the police know that
54 111 S. C. at 1985.
55 Id. at 1986.
56 Id. at 1987.
57 "[T]he privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less
than those in a movable container."
456 U.S. at 823.
58 Id. at 839-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 111 S. Ct. at 1988.
60 I&
61 Id. at 1989.
62 Id. at 1988.
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they may open a bag only if they are actually searching the entire
car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise would
in order to establish the general probable cause required by
Ros."
M3
Law enforcement agents may not, however, "conduct a more
intrusive search in order to justify a less intrusive one " 64 because
probable cause is determined at the outset of the search. Any
evidence found during an otherwise unlawful search does not
serve to retroactively justify that search.' Similarly, if a defendant
contends that a search was illegal because the police searched an
entire vehicle when they had probable cause only to search a
particular package,- the reviewing court will look to the totality of
the circumstances, as they existed before the search was com-
menced, to determine whether the police actually had the general
probable cause Ross requires.'
Second, "[l]aw enforcement officers may seize a container and
hold it until they obtain a warrant,"67 and "since the police ...
have probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that a
warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases."6s This argument proves far too much.
If the Ross rule provided only minimal protection for privacy,
then the Warrant Clause generally, when applied in public places,
also provides only minimal protection. Police can always seize
personal property located anywhere outside a private dwelling
based upon probable cause, and since such property will be seized
upon probable cause, a warrant should be routinely forthcoming.
Privacy will not be greatly protected by the warrant requirement,
because the police will eventually be able to search the property
seized. On the other hand, the time and expense in terms of lost
resources of having to procure a warrant will be a heavy burden
on law enforcement.
This logic ignores the central purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment: to require a neutral and detached magistrate to assess the
63 Id
64 Id at 1989.
65 See, e g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927).
66 Se United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1985) (holding that police had
probable cause to search the entire truck although they chose not to).
67 111 S. Ct. at 1989 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
68 Id (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
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reasonableness of the proposed search by reviewing the officer's
determination of probable cause.' The Court has repeatedly
held that while the warrant requirement imposes a burden on law-
enforcement, and trained professionals usually make reliable assess-
ments in determining the existence of probable cause to conduct
a search, "these factors are outweighed by the individual interest
in privacy that is protected by advance judicial approval.""0
Third, "police often will be able to search containers without
a warrant, despite the Chadwick-Sanders rule, as a search incident
to a lawful arrest."71 The Court claimed that under New York v.
BeltonO2 "the same probable cause to believe that a container
holds drugs will allow the police to arrest the person transporting
the container and search it."'3
This reasoning would greatly expand Belton, in which the
justification for stopping the car and arresting the driver was unre-
lated to the subsequent search. If the Court is going to extend the
"search incident to arrest" doctrine by allowing police to arrest
suspects based solely upon probable cause to believe that a
suspect's package contains contraband, and then allow a search of
that package, the purpose and protection of the Warrant Clause
will be effectively abolished in all situations outside private homes.
Why would a law enforcement officer merely seize a package, hold
it, and await a magistrate's approval to search it, when that officer
can arrest the suspect, based only upon probable cause to believe
that the package contains contraband, and conduct an immediate
search?
69 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) holding that-
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferenc-
es which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime.
Id.
70 California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1995 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1989.
72 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Belton held that:
[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile. It follows from this conclusion that
the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the
passenger compartment.
Id. at 460 (footnote omitted).
73 111 S. Ct. at 1989.
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Fourth, "the search of a paper bag intrudes far less on indi-
vidual privacy than does the incursion sanctioned long ago in
Carrol1'"  Upholstery of an automobile is not, however, a reposi-
tory for personal effects in which one has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Until Acevedo, or at least until Ross, closed contain-
ers and other items of personal property were cloaked with such
an expectation. If they are no longer associated with a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the principal reason for treating them
differently from automobiles disappears and police can now con-
duct warrantless searches of such personal property.
Finally, "It]he Chadwick-Sanders rule is the antithesis of a
clear and unequivocal guideline."75 The Court pointed out that
the state courts and the federal courts of appeals had been re-
versed in their Fourth Amendment holdings twenty-nine times
since Ross.
76
The Court has definitely accomplished its purpose of making
the application of the automobile exception clear and unequivocal
- it now applies to everything in any way associated with an auto-
mobile. "We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule
to govern automobile searches and .... the Carroll doctrine set
forth in Ross now applies to all searches of containers found in an
automobile."77 In its efforts to clarify and simplify the automobile
exception's application, Acevedo may have done much more: it may
have marked the beginning of the Warrant Clause's demise in
public places.
IV. ONE ANOMALY GIVES WAY TO ANOTHER
The Court concluded its analysis by criticizing the
Chadwicd-Sanders rule for allowing fortuity and coincidence to
determine the outcome of Fourth Amendment cases.7' The old
rule created "an anomaly such that the more likely police are to
discover drugs in a container, the less authority they have to
search it."7 9 The Court eradicated this anomaly by expanding the
74 Id. Prohibition agents slashed the upholstery of Carroll's automobile.
75 Id. at 1990.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1991.
78 "Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the search of an auto-
mobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that co-
incidentally turns up in an automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must
not turn on such coincidences." Id.
79 Id. at 1990. If police strongly suspected that a certain container contained con-
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automobile exception to create "one rule to govern all automobile
searches.""0 The anomaly was eliminated; police could now search
all containers seized from automobiles based upon probable cause
alone. However, another, more troubling anomaly was born.
In his dissent Justice Stevens noted the inception of this per-
plexing anomaly:
[S]urely it is anomalous to prohibit the search of a briefcase
while the owner is carrying it exposed on a public street yet to
permit a search once the owner hasplaced the briefcase in the
locked trunk of his car. One's privacy interest in one's luggage
can certainly not be diminished by one's removing it from a
public thoroughfare and placing it-out of sight-in a privately
owned vehicle. Nor is the danger that evidence will escape
increased if the luggage is in a car rather than on the
street. 81
Analyzing the issue by focusing on the closed container and
applying, as Justice Stevens did, the traditional rationales under-
girding the automobile exception-impracticability and the re-
duced expectation of privacy-the warrantless search of Acevedo's
paper bag should have been unconstitutional. Yet the traditional
rationales should also have barred the warrantless search in
Ross. 2 Ostensibly, mobile personal property loses its separate
identity when placed inside an automobile and any privacy inter-
ests an owner may have in its contents yield to the broad scope of
the automobile exception.' But as Justice Stevens pointed out,
this analysis also creates an anomaly which, just as the
traband before it was placed into an automobile, they could not search it without first
obtaining a warrant. On the other hand, if police suspected that contraband was con-
tained somewhere in a vehicle generally and during a search of that vehicle came across
a container, they could immediately search its contents.
80 Id. at 1991.
81 Id. at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 &e supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
83 This would be the most innocuous interpretation of Acevedo. Under this interpre-
tation the analysis focuses on the automobile. The closed container, losing its separate
identity, simply merges into the vehicle and they both become one. The traditional ratio-
nales of impracticability and reduced expectation of privacy then apply to permit the war-
rantiess search of the vehicle and everything in it, including closed containers. However,
by repudiating the reasonable expectation of privacy distinction between automobiles and
other personal property, the Court seems to be focusing its analysis on the container
itself. See infra part IVA., B. In that case, the Court's rationale would seem to support
the constitutionality of warrantless searches of all mobile personal property seized outside
a private home. I&
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Chadwick-Sanders rule did, allows the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to turn on fortuity and coincidence.
4
By emasculating the reasoning of Chadwick and Sanders, Ross
laid the foundation for Acevedo. Acevedo rejected Chadwick's distinc-
tion between automobiles and other personal property, as applied
in Sanders. By renouncing that crucial distinction, the Court ap-
peared to focus its analysis on the container rather than the auto-
mobile and thereby open the door to another frontal assault on
the warrant requirement. The anomaly Acevedo brought to life and
its potential resolution will illustrate this point.
A. Justice Scalia's Proposed Resolution
In his concurring opinion Justice Scalia recognized the newly
created anomaly and proposed a method of resolving it and other
such anomalies in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
He discussed the historical struggle "between imposing a categori-
cal warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone" to
determine what searches were prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment.' Although the warrant requirement had rhetorically pre-
vailed by the late 1960s, it has since "become so riddled with ex-
ceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable."8 In this context,
Justice Scalia viewed Acevedo not as a "momentous departure, but
rather as merely the continuation on an inconsistent jurispru-
dence" that should be made consistent "by returning to the first
principle that the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth
Amendment affords the protection the common law afforded."
7
Justice Scalia argued that "the supposed 'general rule' that a
warrant is always required does not appear to have any basis in
the common law ... and confuses rather than facilitates any at-
tempt to develop rules of reasonableness in light of changed legal
circumstances, as the anomaly eliminated and the anomaly created
84 Law enforcement agents may not search a package being carried in public on the
basis of probable cause alone, unless the Court is serious about tremendously extending
the search incident to arrest doctrine; they may, however, search the same package under
the automobile exception as soon as it is placed in a car.
85 111 S. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring).
86 Id. The Court has used the intricate body of law regarding reasonable expectation
of privacy largely as a means of creating numerous exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. Thus the Court can denominate a search "not a Fourth Amendment 'search'
and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement." Id. at 1993.
87 I& at 1993 (citation omitted).
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by today's holding both demonstrate."' He would resolve such
anomalies by holding that "the search of a closed container, out-
side a privately owned building, with probable cause to believe
that the container contains contraband, and when it in fact does
contain contraband, is not one of those searches whose Fourth
Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant."89
Obviously, Justice Scalia focused his analysis directly on the
container and would explicitly abandon the warrant requirement
as a prerequisite to searches of personal property seized in public
places. His concurrence and the Court's rationale place the war-
rant requirement's continued viability in serious jeopardy.
B. How Would the Court Resolve Its Anomaly?
If Chadwick were argued today, how would the Court rule?
Justice Scalia has already declared himself, and we can apply
Acevedo's reasoning to gain some insight into the factors the Court
would focus upon and how it would rule.
The Chadwick Court disallowed the warrantless search of the
footlocker because of the greater expectation of privacy associated
with luggage and other closed containers when compared to auto-
mobiles.' ° Both Ross and Acevedo have renounced that distinc-
tion.9' If the reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle is
equal to the reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed con-
tainer, why limit the warrantless search of such containers to those
found in vehicles?
The logical implications of the Court's rationale in Acevedo
argue for permitting the warrantless search of mobile personal
property taken from public places. Certainly there is no material
difference, in terms of privacy expectations, between a closed
container or package when it is being transported on the street
and when it is being transported in a car. Nor is there any materi-
al difference in terms of the impracticability of obtaining a war-
rant or the ability of police to hold and store the item pending
the issuance of a warrant.
Acevedo pointed out several reasons why the rule requiring
police to obtain a warrant before searching a closed container
taken from an automobile provided only minimal protection for
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1994.
90 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
91 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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privacy and impeded effective law enforcement. 2 To the extent
that those reasons apply outside the automobile context,93 they
also support the warrantless search of any closed container taken
from a public place.
First, all law enforcement agents may seize an item of person-
al property in a public place based upon probable cause and hold
it until they can obtain a warrant.' Because the seizure will have
been based upon probable cause, the Court contends that presum-
ably a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming
majority of cases and the agents will eventually be able to search
the property anyway.95 An immediate search would be far less
burdensome on law-enforcement, while providing only marginally
less protection for privacy.
Second, on many occasions law-enforcement officers will be
able to search, as a search incident to arrest, the item seized from
a public place without a search warranL96 This is especially so if
the Court is serious about its interpretation of Belton. 7 That
would mean that the same probable cause that a container holds
contraband would allow police to arrest the individual transporting
it and search the container incident to that arrest. 98 No compel-
ling reason would limit such searches incident to arrest to the
automobile context.
Finally, why is it a greater burden upon law enforcement to
obtain a warrant to search a container taken from an automobile,
than to obtain a warrant to search a container taken from any-
where else? The same delays and costs of the warrant procedure
apply in both cases.
Using Acevedo's reasoning, one can make a strong argument
that warrantless searches of all closed containers and packages
seized in public places do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
92 Se supra part llI.B.
93 Nothing in the Court's opinion would limit its reasoning to automobiles.
94 California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1989 (1991) (citing United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
95 Id. (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing)).
96 Ird
97 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
98 It is unlikely that the Court will extend the search incident to arrest doctrine this
far. The original justification for sanctioning searches incident to arrests was for the
officer's protection and to prevent the suspect from destroying relevant evidence. See
Chimel v. California 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Such an extension would certainly render the
application of the Warrant Clause outside the home void.
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warrant requirement provides minimal protection for privacy; po-
lice can detain a suspect's personal property while they procure a
warrant and will eventually be able to search it anyway. Additional-
ly, police may often be able to conduct warrantless searches inci-
dent to arrest. The burden on law enforcement of being required
to obtain a warrant-in terms of lost time and resources-together
with the minimal privacy protection the Warrant Clause provides,
tips the balance in favor of allowing warrantless searches of closed
containers taken from public places, just as it argued for allowing
warrantless searches of closed containers taken from automobiles
in Acevedo.'
V. CONCLUSION
The automobile exception has been extended as far as logic
will allow and perhaps a bit further. A forcible argument can now
be made that the rationales for the automobile exception should
be applied to other forms of personal property seized from public
places. The first frontal assault on the warrant requirement,
launched in Chadwick, failed because it was held that one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage, packages, and other
closed containers, but not in automobiles. Acevedo laid this distinc-
tion to rest;. the door is now wide open to another frontal assault
upon the Warrant Clause.
It has been argued above that Acevedo's reasoning will logically
support the extension of the automobile exception's rationales
outside the automobile context. Justice Scalia has already declared
his willingness to abandon the traditional warrant requirement.
With the logical implications of decisions like Acevedo, the full
Court cannot be far behind.
Peter C. Prynkiewicz
99 See supra part III.B.
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